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I. IN T R O D U C T I O N: TH E SH I F T I N PA R A D I G M
The number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) has increased dra-
matically in the past decade. Until the mid-s, a bare handful of BITs
existed, and the numbers increased only at a slow or moderate pace until
the early s. By September , however, some  states had con-
cluded more than  BITs; by , more than  BITs had entered
into force among about  states; and by the end of ,  BITs
had been signed. Particular provisions of BITs vary from state to state.
But certain general features, which respond to the demands of expanding
globalization and, as a consequence, the increasing interdependence of
national economies, characterize virtually all BITs. BITs seek to establish
a stable, orderly framework for investment by creating, as the preamble
to a typical United Kingdom BIT states, ‘favourable conditions for
greater investment by nationals and companies of one state in the territory
of the other state’.
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 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty, ()  AJIL
, –.
 Rudolf Dolzer & Margrete Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties xii (); see also id. at
– (chronological list of BITs as of ).
 Antonio R. Parra, The Role of ICSID in the Settlement of International Investment Disputes, 
ICSID News, Winter , at –; see also Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, ()  Harv. Int’l L.J. ,  (‘By the mid-s, [BITs] were being nego-
tiated at the rate of one every other day.’).
 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report , at . The num-
bers continue to grow, see Dolzer & Stevens, supra n. , at xii; ICSID, Bilateral Investment Treaties,
–, at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/intro.htm (last visited July , ).
A number of multilateral treaties, including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
Dec. , , Can.-Mex.-U.S.,  Stat. ,  ILM  (), and the Energy Charter Treaty,
Dec. , , ()  ILM , contain substantively similar provisions on the treatment of for-
eign investment. See NAFTA, ch. ; Energy Charter Treaty, Pt. III, art. .
 Vandevelde, supra n. , at –; ICSID, supra n.  (‘Modern BITs have retained broad uni-
formity in their provisions. In addition to determining the scope of application of the treaty, that is,
the investments and investors covered by it, virtually all bilateral investment treaties cover four sub-
stantive areas: admission, treatment, expropriation and the settlement of disputes. Almost all mod-
ern BITs include provisions dealing with disputes between one of the parties and investors having
the nationality of the other party.’)
 Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Panama for the Promotion and Protection
of Investments, Oct. , , U.K-Pan., pmbl., ()  ILM ,  [hereafter U.K-Pan. BIT]. 
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For analogous language in a typical United States BIT, see, for example, Treaty Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Russian Federation Concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Russ., June , , pmbl., ()
 ILM ,  [hereafter U.S.-Russ. BIT] (noting the parties mutual ‘desir[e] to promote greater
economic cooperation between them, with respect to investment by nationals and companies of one
Party in the territory of the other Party’).
 Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration  (); see generally Theodor Meron,
Investment Insurance in International Law ().
 Dolzer & Stevens, supra n. , at ; see also Dale R. Weigel & Burns H. Weston, Valuation Upon
the Deprivation of Foreign Enterprise: A Policy-Oriented Approach to the Problem of Compensation
Under International Law, in  The Valuation of Nationalized Property in International Law , –
(Richard B. Lillich ed. ); cf. Revere Copper v Overseas Private Inv. Corp. (OPIC), Award of
Aug. , , ()  ILR , – (observing that private parties ‘committing large amounts
of capital over a long period of time require contractual guarantees for their security; governments
of developing countries in turn are willing to provide such guarantees in order to promote much
needed economic development’).
The two states that conclude a BIT most frequently elect to create such
a regime for different, albeit interlocking and interdependent, reasons,
and based on distinct, albeit interrelated, interests. For capital-exporting
states, on the one hand, BITs offer their investors vital insurance against
expropriation or other arbitrary treatment of investments; for develop-
ing, capital-importing states, on the other, BITs ‘send an important sig-
nal to the international business community to the effect that that [state]
not only welcomes foreign investment but will also facilitate and protect
certain foreign ventures’. This latter interest distinguishes BITs in a
vital but under-appreciated respect from their predecessors of an earlier
generation, viz., Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties (FCNs).
FCNs, like BITs, were premised on the assumption that an increase
in foreign investment in a developing state would benefit both parties:
The foreign investor would earn a reasonable profit, and the host state’s 
economy would experience the benefits of the multiplier effect, i.e. the
investment would introduce new human resources and capital, transfer
skills and technologies, create additional employment, develop new
industries and markets, and so forth, the benefits of which would, in
turn, multiply themselves throughout various areas key to the health and
continuing growth of the developing state’s economy. International law’s
assumption has been that the increase in direct foreign investment, espe-
cially in resource extraction, would also benefit the world community as
a whole by bringing more goods onto the market and thereby lowering
costs. FCNs, like BITs, are instruments to achieve these goals. But while
FCNs addressed diverse matters in the areas of trade and investment, in
the context of expropriations, the prototypical FCN treaty did little more
than impose upon the host state an obligation not to expropriate covered
foreign investments without paying compensation for them. Insofar as
the host state honored that commitment, it had discharged its obligations
to its treaty partner and that partner’s national investors.
In this regard FCNs implicitly relied on a relatively simple theory of eco-
nomic development: Merely put foreign investment into an underdevelo-
ped economy, and, provided the host state refrains from expropriating the
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 See generally Friedrich A. Hayek, Law, Legislation & Liberty ( Vols., , , ).
 For a thorough analysis of the economic and development theories of BITs, and their philo-
sophical underpinnings, see generally Vandevelde, supra n. , at –; Vandevelde, supra n. , at
–.
 See, in this regard, Mondev Int’l Ltd. v United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)//, Award
of Oct. , , ()  ILM , , para. .
investment, it will generate a reasonable profit while the host state will
experience the benefits of the multiplier effect. A generation weaned on
Hayek and navigating amid the detritus of hundreds of well-intentioned
but disastrous multilateral and national development programs now
knows better. BITs reflect this knowledge, in particular, by relying on a
far more sophisticated understanding of the ‘favourable conditions’ neces-
sary to achieve the intersecting goals of the investor and the host state.
The economic and development theory of the BIT may be seen as part
of a larger phenomenon: the ‘structural readjustment’ movement iden-
tified with the International Monetary Fund and, latterly, the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD)
and private initiatives’ ‘transparency’ programs. That movement recog-
nizes that the profits of the foreign investor, no less than the multiplier
effect in the host state’s economy, depend on appropriate internal legal,
administrative, and regulatory structures, all conducted through ‘trans-
parent’ procedures designed to ensure that things are actually done the
way they are supposed to be done. The ‘favourable conditions’ estab-
lished by BITs consist, not merely of natural phenomena such as climate,
resources, and access to the sea, nor even of an educated population in
the host state receptive to and eager to participate in the benefits of for-
eign investment; they also contemplate, more significantly and innova-
tively, an effective normative framework: impartial courts, an efficient
and legally restrained bureaucracy, and the measure of transparency in
decision that has increasingly been recognized as a control mechanism
over governments and as a vital component of the international standard
of governance. Hence, in a BIT regime, the host state must do far more
than open its doors to foreign investment and refrain from overt expro-
priation. It must establish and maintain an appropriate legal,
administrative, and regulatory framework, the legal environment that
modern investment theory has come to recognize as a conditio sine qua non
of the success of private enterprise. This is not to say, of course, that
every governmental adjustment to this normative framework that
adversely affects the conditions for foreign investment will constitute an
expropriatory act, but that an appropriately operational governmental
framework must be in place.
Given the socioeconomic revolution of which they are part, it is no sur-
prise that the proliferation of BITs coincides with large-scale privatiza-
tion policies in developing states. Privatization, the BIT generation
recognizes, demands far more than selling off economically inefficient
publicly-owned or -managed companies to private investors. It also
requires, particularly in the utility sector, the simultaneous establishment
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of a regulatory environment (unnecessary, of course, for state-owned
industries) that forms part of the indispensable normative and legal
framework without which private industry, no less than the public it
serves, cannot survive, let alone thrive. Privatization, that is, calls for the
very ‘stable and orderly framework for investment’ that BITs strive to
establish. In this respect BITs pursue the macrolegal side of the macro-
economic structural readjustment policies encouraged by multilateral
financial institutions. BITs consciously seek to approximate in the devel-
oping, capital-importing state the minimal legal, administrative, and reg-
ulatory framework that fosters and sustains investment in industrialized
capital-exporting states.
II. IN D I R E C T EX P R O P R I AT I O N I N T H E BIT GE N E R AT I O N
By no means, however, has this shift in regime paradigm obviated the
need to deter expropriation in the BIT generation; if anything, that need
has increased. To shield investors from illegal expropriation and other
arbitrary or discriminatory governmental conduct that threatens to dis-
courage foreign investment remains a vital purpose of BITs. For that
reason, BITs almost invariably include provisions codifying a lex specialis
to handle claims of expropriation. Because states at times find them-
selves compelled to take private property for a public purpose such as
development or environmental preservation, the practice of eminent
domain, insofar as it serves quintessential sovereign interests, will not
cease. But with the eclipse of socialism, overt expropriation by formal
decree has become relatively rare.
Recognizing the need to attract private foreign capital and techno-
logy, many putative capital-importing states in the BIT generation, as
in the FCN generation, do not wish to be perceived internationally as pos-
ing a frequent or arbitrary threat of expropriation. For this reason, those
states far more frequently expropriate foreign investments indirectly.
The BIT generation therefore appreciates, more than its FCN predeces-
sor, that foreign investments may be expropriated ‘indirectly through
measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization’. This phrase,
contained in the United States-Russia BIT and mirrored in substance in
virtually all BITs, includes, not simply intentional and obvious indirect
expropriations, nor only intentional creeping expropriations, a frequent
form of taking in prior generations. It also captures the multiplicity of
inappropriate regulatory acts, omissions, and other deleterious conduct
INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION AND
 We do not explore in this article the question whether, and at what point, BITs and associated
jurisprudence may, in the aggregate, indicate the emergence of customary international law. See
n.  infra.
 E.g. Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB//,
Award of Feb. , , ()  ILM  (award on claim arising from a legal expropriation carried
out for the avowed purpose of environmental conservation).
 Dolzer & Stevens, supra n. , at –.  U.S.-Russ. BIT, art. III().
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that undermines the vital normative framework created and maintained
by BITs—and by which governments can, in effect but not name, now be
deemed to have expropriated a foreign national’s investment. The major
innovation of the ‘tantamount’ clause, found in substance in almost all
BITs, therefore consists in extending the concept of indirect expropri-
ation to an egregious failure to create or maintain the normative
‘favourable conditions’ in the host state.
Jurists and scholars refer to indirect expropriations variously, and often
interchangeably, as regulatory, constructive, consequential, disguised, de
facto or creeping. Some of these terms, however, connote behavior that
may not have been legally cognizable under an FCN regime, but could
furnish a sound basis for a claim under a BIT regime. This development,
together with the proliferation of international jurisprudence on expro-
priation since the early s—much of which emanates from the Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal and ICSID tribunals constituted pursuant to
BITs or multilateral investment treaties such as NAFTA, but some of
which may be found in less obvious sources, such as, for example, the
case law of the European Court of Human Rights—invites inquiry into,
and further refinement of, the concept of indirect expropriation and the
problem of its valuation.
A. I N D I R E C T E X P R O P R I AT I O N S
The general concept of indirect expropriations is not novel. In a seminal
study in  in the British Yearbook of International Law, G.C. Christie
analyzed two early international decisions concerning expropriation:
the judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice in Certain
German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, and the arbitral award ren-
dered by a tribunal established pursuant to a special agreement between
Norway and the United States in the Norwegian Shipowners Claims
case. These cases, Christie concluded, establish (i) ‘that a State may
expropriate property, where it interferes with it, even though the State
expressly disclaims any such intention,’ and (ii) ‘that even though a State
may not purport to interfere with rights to property, it may, by its actions,
render those rights so useless that it will be deemed to have expropriated
ITS VALUATION IN THE BIT GENERATION 
 As emphasized above, we do not suggest that every governmental adjustment to the normative
framework for foreign investment that adversely affect the conditions for foreign investment, ipso
facto, constitutes an expropriatory act.
 Burns H. Weston, ‘Constructive Takings’ Under International Law: A Modest and Foray into
the Problem of ‘Creeping Expropriation’, ()  Va. J. Int’l L. , .
 George H. Aldrich, What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property? The Decisions of the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, ()  AJIL ,  n.  (noting that [w]hile the Algiers
Declarations gave the Tribunal broad discretion in its choice of law (art. V of the Claims Settlement
Declaration), international law almost invariably has been applied by the Tribunal in its decisions
on takings of property).
 G.C. Christie, What Constitutes a Taking Under International Law, ()  BYBIL , –.
 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v Poland),  PCIJ Rep Series
A. No.  (May ).  Norwegian Shipowners Claims (Norway v U.S.) ()  RIAA .
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them.’ Subsequently, international decisions and commentary alike
have incorporated these conclusions.
The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, for example, has repeatedly held that
‘[t]he intent of the government [concerning expropriation] is less import-
ant than the effects of the measures on the owner and the form of the
measures of control or interference is less important than the reality of
their impact’. As in Phillips Petroleum Co. v Iran, a deprivation of prop-
erty may be effected by ‘a series of concrete actions rather than [by] any
particular formal decree’. A recent ICSID panel emphasized the ‘ample
authority for the proposition that property has been expropriated when the
effect of the measures taken by the state has been to deprive the owner of
title, possession or access to the benefit and economic use of his 
property.’ Jurisprudence emanating from the European Court of Human
Rights, while technically an exercise in interpretation of a human rights
treaty, provides additional evidence of the authoritative consensus that
international law prohibits de facto and indirect, not only de jure and
direct, expropriations. In Sporrong v Kingdom of Sweden, for example, the
Court found that while certain ‘expropriation permits left intact in law the
owners’ right to use and dispose of their possessions, they nevertheless in
practice significantly reduced the possibility of its exercise’, and concluded
that ‘[i]n the absence of a formal expropriation, that is to say a transfer of
ownership, the Court . . . must look behind appearances and investigate the
realities of the situation complained of [because] the Convention is intend-
ed to guarantee rights that are “practical and effective” ’.
Hence, in , the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law could
say, on the basis of a solid body of authority, that States ‘bear responsibility,
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 Christie, supra n. , at ; accord Judge Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property by the
State: Recent Developments in International Law, in () III Recueil Des Cours , – (ana-
lyzing the same decisions and arriving at the similar conclusion that ‘these two cases certainly indic-
ate that an expropriation of a given property may in fact—regardless of stated intention—involve a
taking of closely connected ancillary rights’).
 Tippets v Tams-Affa Consulting Eng’rs, ()  Iran-US CTR , –; accord Int’l Sys. &
Control Operations v Indus. Dev. and Renovation Org., ()  Iran-US CTR , para. ; Payne v
Iran, ()  Iran-US CTR , para. ; Phelps Dodge Corp. v Iran, ()  US CTR , para. ;
see also Aldrich, supra n. , at .  Phillips Petroleum Co. v Iran, ()  Iran-US CTR .
 Id. at –.
 Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB// Award
of Feb. , , ()  ILM , , para.  (citing Tippets,  Iran-US CTR. at –).
 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. , ,  U.N.T.S. , and especially the protocols thereto.
 Sporrong v Kingdom of Sweden Series A ()  EHRR paras , .; cf. De la Grange v Italy,
()  EHRR , para. (d) (finding no expropriation on the facts, but observing that ‘[w]here,
following an administrative decision concerning specific property, the owner retains the ownership
subject to restrictions which reduce to virtually nothing the economic value of the use or exchange
of the property, this is known as “value expropriation” (espropriazione di valore) and it gives rise to
an entitlement to compensation’); Agrotexim v Greece ()  EHRR ,  (disclaiming juris-
diction based on considerations of standing, but noting the European Commission’s conclusion that
the Municipality of Athens, by ‘repeated declarations of officials [threatening to] acquire the com-
pany’s land and . . . the placement of signposts indicating that the area would be expropriated even
though they left intact in law the company’s property rights’, had created a situation whereby the
company could neither operate effectively nor attract potential investment).
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not only for “avowed” expropriations in which the government formally
takes title to property, but also [for] other actions of the government that
have the effect of “taking” the property, in whole or in large part, out-
right or in stages’. A more recent U.N. study provides: ‘Indirect expro-
priation occurs when the country takes an action that substantially
impairs the value of an investment without necessarily assuming owner-
ship of the investment. Accordingly, indirect expropriation may occur
even though the host country disavows any intent to expropriate the
investment.’ Scholars, finally, almost without exception, concur. In her
 Hague Lectures, for example, Judge Rosalyn Higgins analyzed the
jurisprudence on indirect expropriations in some detail, and her conclu-
sions corroborate the general principles formulated by Christie.
In short, international tribunals, jurists, and scholars have consistently
appreciated that states may accomplish expropriation in ways other than
by formal decree; indeed, often in ways that may seek to cloak expropria-
tory conduct with a veneer of legitimacy. For this reason, tribunals have
increasingly accepted that expropriation must be analyzed in consequen-
tial rather than formal terms. What matters is the effect of governmental
conduct—whether malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance, or some
combination of the three—on foreign property rights or control over an
investment, not whether the state promulgates a formal decree or other-
wise expressly proclaims its intent to expropriate. For purposes of state
responsibility and the obligation to make adequate reparation, interna-
tional law does not distinguish indirect from direct expropriations.
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 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law section  cmt. (g) ().
 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid-s,
at  ().
 Higgins, supra n. , at –; Christie, supra n. , at –; see also Martin Domke, Foreign
Nationalizations: Some Aspects of Contemporary International Law, ()  AJIL , –. For
the contrary (minority) view, see, for example, M. Sornarajah, The International Law of Foreign
Investment ().
 See, in this regard, the classic statement of the arbitral tribunal in Revere Copper v Overseas
Private Inv. Corp. (OPIC), Award of Aug. , , ()  ILR , –:
the effects of the Jamaican Government’s actions in repudiating its long term commitments to
RJA ha[d] substantially the same impact on effective control over use and operation as if the pro-
perties were themselves conceded by a concession contract that was repudiated . . . OPIC argues
that RJA still has all the rights and property that it had before the [expropriatory] events of :
it is in possession of the plant and other facilities; it has its Mining Lease; it can operate as it did
before. This may be true in a formal sense but . . . we do not regard RJA’s ‘control’ of the use and
operation of its properties as any longer ‘effective’ in view of the destruction by Government
actions of its contract rights
Id. at .
 See generally Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, arts.
, , in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, U.N.
GAOR, th Sess., Supp. No. , at , U.N. Doc. A// (), annexed to G.A. Res. /
(Dec. , ) (noting the principles, respectively, that ‘[e]very internationally wrongful act of a
State entails the international responsibility of that State’ (art. ), and that ‘the responsible State is
under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act’
(art. ) ); see also id., arts. – (setting forth the general forms of reparation available under inter-
national law, viz., restitution, compensation, satisfaction, and interest).
 That BITs embrace this equivalence is evident from, for example, the text of the BIT between
the United States and Argentina. Article VI() of that BIT proscribes all expropriations, including
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Within the normative legal regime created by BITs, as under customary
international law, indirect expropriations—typically denominated by
phrases such as ‘measures tantamount to expropriation’, ‘measures having
effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation’, or by some substan-
tively comparable language—require fact-sensitive inquiries into the practi-
cal effect of an event or events on a foreign investor’s rights. In general,
‘[w]here the effect is similar to what might have occurred under an outright
expropriation, the investor would in all likelihood be covered under most
BIT provisions’. Moreover, again as under customary international law,
the impact of each governmental measure must be analyzed, not in isola-
tion, but cumulatively, because, as the European Court of Human Rights
wrote in this context, ‘the consequences of [the state’s] interference [are]
undoubtedly rendered more serious by the[ir] combined use’.
The concept of indirect expropriation has therefore become an estab-
lished feature of customary international law on state responsibility to
aliens. Within the BIT generation, however, at least two ‘species’ of the
genre of indirect expropriations can be usefully identified and distin-
guished. Because these distinctions may facilitate the appraisal of liability
for indirect expropriations, their valuation processes, and the liquidation of
the amount of compensation due for foreign property so expropriated, it is
worthwhile to identify and define these species in greater detail.
B. C R E E P I N G E X P R O P R I AT I O N S
Not every indirect expropriation is properly described as ‘creeping’.
Creeping expropriations pose unique problems, both with respect to the
determination of (i) liability, i.e. at what stage, if any, the accretion of
wrongful interferences (many of which, alone, may seem innocuous)
should be deemed expropriatory as a matter of law; and (ii) valuation,
i.e. as of what date the value of property rights so expropriated should be
INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION AND
those accomplished ‘indirectly through measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization,’
which, as the immediately following parenthetical confirms, must be deemed indistinguishable from
expropriation simpliciter.
 E.g. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Arg., Nov. , , art. IV(),
()  ILM  [hereafter U.S.-Arg. BIT].  E.g. U.K.-Pan. BIT, art. V().
 Dolzer & Stevens, supra n. , at  (citing Starrett Hous. Corp. v. Iran ()  Iran-US CTR
,  ILM , ); K. Scott Gudgeon, Valuation of Nationalized Property Under United States
and Other Bilateral Investment Treaties, in IV The Valuation of Nationalized Property in International
Law ,  (Richard B. Lillich ed., ) (noting that BITs define expropriation ‘in a manner that
promotes substance over form,’ thereby employing the so-called ‘effects test’, which reaches all forms
of creeping expropriation).  Sporrong v Kingdom of Sweden, Series A  EHRR at , para. .
 Substantial overlap between the various gradations of indirect expropriation can, and 
frequently will, exist. It is nevertheless useful to identify and distinguish these species because, as
we explain below, it helps to clarify (i) the existence vel non of an expropriation under a BIT
regime; (ii) the moment at which that expropriation occurs; and (iii) the moment from which the
value of an enterprise so expropriated should be valuated for purposes of respecting paramount
principles of international law on reparation.
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assessed. Without concurrently purporting to take title to property or
to appropriate a foreign investor’s commercial rights, a state might, for
example, appoint an unreasonably intrusive government ‘supervisor’, or
fix prices for a commodity indispensable to the production process at
a level that destroys an enterprise’s economic viability, or refuse to hold
feckless administrators to account for failure to carry out their assigned
tasks. A wide variety of measures—including taxation, regulation,
denial of due process, delay and non-performance, and other forms of
governmental malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance—may be
deemed expropriatory if those measures significantly reduce an investor’s
property rights or render them practically useless. But if one or two
events in that series can readily be identified as those that destroyed the
investment’s value, then to speak of a creeping expropriation may be mis-
leading. Keith Highet cogently explained in a dissenting opinion that
a ‘creeping’ expropriation is comprised of a number of elements, none of
which can—separately—constitute the international wrong [i.e. the creeping
expropriation]. These constituent elements [may] include non-payment, non-
reimbursement, cancellation, denial of judicial access, actual practice to 
exclude, non-conforming treatment, inconsistent legal blocks, and so forth. The
‘measure’ at issue is the [creeping] expropriation itself; it is not merely a sub-
component part of expropriation.
In what one commentator described as ‘the case closest to true “creep-
ing” expropriation, the government of Somalia directed sundry acts of
harassment (including occasional arrests of key employees, blocking
access to the plant site, and the nationalization of an oil depot which was
a portion of the activities of the project) against a foreign-owned shell-
fish processing facility’, ultimately compelling the plant manager to
terminate operations. OPIC decided, upon confirmation of these facts
by the U.S. State Department, ‘that the actions of the Somalian govern-
ment, though not openly expropriatory, were calculated to disrupt the
operations of the foreign enterprise to such an extent that an inference of
expropriatory intent could be drawn’; it therefore ‘honored the claim’.
Where, as in Fearn International, Inc., the decision-maker can infer
expropriatory intent, it tends to be simple to characterize the aggregate of
events as a taking. In some, if not most other, creeping expropriations,
however, that intent, though possibly present at some level of the host
state’s government, will be difficult, if not impossible, to discern. Discrete
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 Tax measures alleged to be expropriatory may raise unique concerns. By its ‘tax veto’ provi-
sion, for example, NAFTA suggests a qualitative difference between taxation and other measures
that can, alone or in combination, culminate in an apparent expropriation. NAFTA, art. (); see
William W. Park, Arbitration and the FISC: NAFTA’s ‘Tax Veto’,  Chi. J. Int’l L.  ().
 Dolzer & Stevens, supra n. , at ; see also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
section  cmt. (g) ().
 Waste Mgmt., Inc. v United Mexican States ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)//, Award of June ,
, ()  ILM ,  (Keith Highet, dissenting).
 Vance R. Koven, Expropriation and the ‘Jurisprudence’ of OPIC, ()  Harv. J. Int’l L. , .
 Id.
Crav1-CH03.qxd  15/11/04  9:00 PM  Page 123
acts, analyzed in isolation rather than in the context of the overall flow of
events, may, whether legal or not in themselves, seem innocuous vis-à-vis
a potential expropriation. Some may not be expropriatory in themselves.
Only in retrospect will it become evident that those acts comprised part
of an accretion of deleterious acts and omissions, which in the aggregate
expropriated the foreign investor’s property rights. Indeed, the acts—
malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance—comprising the expropria-
tion in creeping expropriations may be part of a series that includes many
lawful ones. The Restatement confirms that a creeping expropriation may
occur where State action ‘makes it impossible for the [foreign investor] to
operate at a profit,’ because ‘a State may seek to achieve the same result
[i.e. expropriation] by taxation and regulatory measures designed to make
continued economic operation of a project uneconomical so that it is
abandoned’. We emphasize ‘designed’ because the actual taking may
not be comprised of acts that were specifically intended to expropriate,
even though that is their natural and foreseeable consequence.
Because of the absence of a manifest intent in such cases, Judge Brower
once observed that ‘it is difficult to envision a de facto or “creeping”
expropriation ever being lawful, for the absence of a declared intention to
expropriate almost certainly implies that no contemporaneous provision
for compensation has been made. Indeed, research reveals no interna-
tional precedent finding such an expropriation to have been lawful’.
Were disclaimers of expropriatory intent sufficient to validate otherwise
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 At the same time, one unlawful act within a series of otherwise lawful regulatory acts by the
State cannot transform an innocent progression of legitimate, reasonable regulations in the public
interest into a creeping expropriation. But this is simply to restate a point made earlier and through-
out this article: that indirect expropriations of all kinds, but particularly creeping expropriations,
require acutely fact-sensitive inquiries.
 Restatement (third) of Foreign Relations section  nn. – () (emphasis added). It is
noteworthy that U.S. case law on the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment adopts substantially
the same principle in the context of utility-rate regulation. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Barach,
 US ,  () (‘[I]t is not theory but the impact of the rate order which counts . . . [W]het-
her a particular rate is unjust or unreasonable will depend to some extent on what is a fair rate of
return given the risks under a particular rate-setting system, and on the amount of capital upon
which the investors are entitled to earn that return’.) (quoting FPC v Hope Natural Gas Co.  US
,  ()) (emphasis added); Covington & Lexington Turnpike Rd. Co. v Sandford  US
,  () (finding a rate to be impermissibly low if it is ‘so unjust as to destroy the value of
[the] property for all the purposes for which it was acquired’, and therefore ‘to practically deprive 
[ ] the owner of property without due process of law’). On regulatory takings generally, see, for exam-
ple, the classic statement of Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon,  US  ():
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be dimin-
ished without paying for every such change in the general law. As long recognized some values are
enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied
limitation must have its limits or the contract and due process clauses [of the Constitution] are
gone. One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of diminution. When it
reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be . . . compensation to sustain the
act . . . The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if reg-
ulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.
Id. at , . The Takings Clause has also created a rich jurisprudence on valuation that
arguably contributes to the evolution of international standards. See Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete
Compensation for Takings, ()  N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. , –.
 Sedco, Inc. v Nat’l Ir. Oil Co.,  Iran-US CTR , ()  ILM ,  (Brower, J., 
concurring).
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expropriatory acts, states could avoid their obligation to make reparation
simply by asserting the absence of that intent. Because of their gradual
and cumulative nature, creeping expropriations also render it problem-
atic, perhaps even arbitrary, to identify a single interference (or failure to
act where a duty requires it) as the ‘moment of expropriation’. Several
ICSID awards illustrate these problems well.
In Benvenuti et Bonfant v People’s Republic of the Congo, the claimant,
an Italian firm (B&B), entered into a joint venture with the Congo to cre-
ate a company to manufacture plastic bottles of mineral water (PLASCO).
The Congolese government agreed to establish a special tax regime for
PLASCO, to adopt protectionist measures to obviate the threat of for-
eign competition, and to guarantee PLASCO’s financing. Almost
immediately after it began operations, however, problems developed.
Over the ensuing months and years, the government, inter alia, defaulted
on its financing obligations, unilaterally fixed the prices for bottles of
mineral water bottles below the level agreed upon at the initial meeting
of PLASCO’s Board of Directors, failed to establish the preferential tax
regime contemplated by the joint venture, neglected or refused to call
regular meetings of the Board, and failed to adopt protectionist measures
limiting the import of mineral water.
Ultimately, the Congolese military occupied PLASCO’s corporate head-
quarters, and the government instituted criminal proceedings against one
Corrado Bonfant, a principal of B&B, compelling B&B to shut down oper-
ations and quit the Congo. At no time, however, did the Congolese gov-
ernment purport to expropriate B&B’s share of PLASCO. In fact, it
insisted throughout the subsequent arbitration ‘that the Italian party can
return and take back its share at any time.’ The ICSID tribunal convened
to hear B&B’s claim nonetheless agreed with B&B that the cumulative
effect of the government’s acts (e.g. price-fixing) and omissions (e.g. fail-
ure to establish a preferential tax regime or prohibit foreign imports) ‘de
facto expropriated [B&B’s] corporate shares in the PLASCO company’.
In Liberian Eastern Timber Corp. (LETCO) v Liberia, Liberia con-
cluded a concession contract, the ‘Forest Products Utilization Contract’
with LETCO, a company wholly owned by French nationals. The con-
tract gave LETCO ‘the exclusive right to harvest, process, transport and
market timber and other forest products and to conduct other timbering
operations in the “Exploitation Area”, which covered some , to
, acres of forest, for a twenty-year period’. In exchange, LETCO
agreed to pay specified taxes, to avoid exploiting certain species of trees,
to abide by Liberian labor law, ‘to give preference to competent and quali-
fied Liberian citizens when hiring’, and ‘to erect and maintain an effi-
cient sawmill plant’ and other assets and infrastructure, which the contract
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 Benvenuti et Bonfant v People’s Republic of the Congo, ICSID Award of Aug. , , () 
ILM .  Id. at –.
 Id. at –, –.  Id. at .  Id.  Id.
 Liber. E. Timber Corp. v Liberia, ICSID Award of Mar. ,  (rectified May , ),
()  ILM .  Id. at .
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contemplated would be left ‘in good and safe-running order’ upon the
expiration of the concession. Subsequently, over a period of several
years, Liberia withdrew portions of the Exploitation Area, demanded
renegotiation of the concession contract, failed to comply with certain
notification provisions of the contract, and granted repossessed forest
areas within the concession’s scope to ‘foreign companies . . . run by
people who were “good friends” of the Liberian authorities’.
As in Benvenuti et Bonfant, Liberia never expressly expropriated
LETCO’s property rights, directly or indirectly. Indeed, while this case
involved a breach of contract, the tribunal effectively found that
Liberia’s act constituted expropriation even absent an avowed expropri-
atory intent. But the tribunal found that even assuming, arguendo, that
Liberia had sought to justify its actions as a legitimate act of nationaliza-
tion, any such contention would fail because ‘the taking of LETCO’s
property was not for a bona fide public purpose, was discriminatory and
was not accompanied by an offer of appropriate compensation’.
Indeed, while Liberia ultimately defaulted, it had previously justified its
actions by claiming that LETCO had breached various obligations under
the concession contract—a claim rejected on the facts by the ICSID tri-
bunal convened to hear LETCO’s claim.
In Metalclad Corp. v United Mexican States, an ICSID tribunal
heard a claim brought against Mexico under Chapter  of NAFTA,
alleging that Mexico expropriated Metalclad’s purchase, construction,
and development of a hazardous-waste landfill. Examining ‘[t]he totality
of the[ ] circumstances’, the tribunal found ‘a lack of orderly process and
timely disposition [with respect to Metalclad’s application for certain
perfunctory municipal permits] in relation to [a foreign] investor acting
in the expectation that it would be treated fairly and justly in accordance
with the NAFTA’. The tribunal concluded that an accumulation of
harmful acts and omissions of the Municipality of Guadalcazar, which
interfered with Metalclad’s reasonable expectations, ‘taken together with
the representations of the Mexican federal government, on which
Metalclad relied, and the absence of a timely, orderly or substantive basis
for the denial by the Municipality of a local construction permit,
amount[ed] to an indirect expropriation’. Again, the defendant govern-
ment denied an intent to expropriate. And again, the tribunal found
proof vel non of that intent to be immaterial. The tribunal’s conclusion
that Mexico had expropriated Metalclad’s investment rested on an exam-
ination of the aggregate effects or consequences of Mexico’s conduct:
[E]xpropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate and acknow-
ledged takings of property, such as outright seizure or formal or obligatory trans-
fer of title in favour of the host State, but also covert or incidental interference
INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION AND
 Id. at .  Id. at –.  Id. at .  Id.  Id.
 Metalclad Corp. v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB//, Award of Aug. ,
, ()  ILM .  Id. at .
 Id.
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with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole
or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit
of property . . .
In each of the above cases, the host government therefore accomplished an
expropriation, not only indirectly, but furtively, through often seemingly
trivial acts of sometimes nebulous legality or propriety. Considered in 
isolation, for example, it would be implausible to say that the Congolese gov-
ernment’s neglect to call regular meetings of PLASCO’s Board of Directors,
ipso facto, effected an indirect expropriation. Conversely, however, it would
be equally implausible to deny that all the acts preceding the Congolese mil-
itary’s occupation of PLASCO’s corporate headquarters, appraised in terms
of their cumulative impact, did not effect an indirect expropriation until
the dramatic moment at which that occupation forced B&B’s staff to flee the
country and initiate arbitration. In an analogous context, former Judge of
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Howard M. Holtzmann, concurring in the
Starrett Housing Corp. Interlocutory Award, wrote:
The Interlocutory Award correctly holds that [the appointment of a government
manager] was an act of expropriation because it denied Claimants their right to
manage and control Shah Goli and the Project. The appointment of the
manager was not, however, the first or only act of expropriation; in fact, it was
the last of a series of such measures. The Interlocutory Award ignores the real
impact of other decisive acts which resulted in a taking of Claimant’s property
rights many months before. Although the Government of Iran on  January
 took the formal step of appointing a manager for the property which it had
already taken, that final measure cannot logically serve to obscure the earlier acts
of expropriation. In my view, a realistic assessment of the facts would have been
preferable to the sterile formalism of the Interlocutory Award.
By a ‘steady and inexorable’ progression of expropriatory acts and omis-
sions, the governments in each of these cases deprived foreign investors
of their property rights or rendered those rights practically useless.
ITS VALUATION IN THE BIT GENERATION 
 Id. at . A Canadian court subsequently vacated the Metalclad award in part. See The United
Mexican States v Metalclad Corp., Supreme Court of British Columbia, Reasons for Judgment, 
BCSC ,  ILR , ()  ICSID Rep . Judge Tysoe held that the NAFTA Tribunal
exceeded its jurisdiction insofar as it held that the events preceding Mexico’s Ecological Decree con-
stituted an expropriation, because the Tribunal’s analysis of section  of NAFTA imposed a
transparency obligation not found in that section, which ‘infected’ its section  analysis to the
extent that the latter involved analysis of the cumulative impact of events preceding the Decree—
including failure to abide by the transparency obligation. See id. paras –. Wholly apart from the
substantive merits of Judge Tysoe’s judgment, an inquiry beyond the scope of this article, we note
that this judgment did not cast doubt on the definition of a creeping expropriation under customary
international law; its import is limited to the treaty regime established by NAFTA. But see id. 
para.  (suggesting that the Tribunal employed an ‘extremely broad’ definition of expropriation,
but finding that this is an issue to which the court must defer under the arbitration law of British
Columbia).
 Cf. Koven, supra n. , at  (‘Where a “creeping” expropriation manifests itself over a long
period of time, the definition of expropriatory action appears to ignore the chain of events prior to
the one “act” which is ultimately deemed to be the one determining the date of expropriation.’).
 Starrett Hous. Corp. v Iran,  Iran-US CTR , ()  ILM ,  (Holtzmann, J.,
concurring).  Id.
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A creeping expropriation therefore denotes, in the paradigmatic case,
an expropriation accomplished by a cumulative series of regulatory acts
or omissions over a prolonged period of time, no one of which can neces-
sarily be identified as the decisive event that deprived the foreign
national of the value of its investment. Moreover, they may be inter-
spersed with entirely lawful state regulatory actions. By definition,
then, creeping expropriations lack the vividness and transparency not
only of formal expropriations, but also of many regulatory or otherwise
indirect expropriations, which may be identified more closely with a
few discrete events. The gradual and sometimes furtive nature of the
acts and omissions that culminate in a creeping expropriation tends
to obscure what tribunals ordinarily denominate the ‘moment of
expropriation’.
Because a creeping expropriation, by its nature, cannot be defined by
reference to a single, readily identifiable, expropriatory act, whether
direct or not, attempting to discern the precise moment of expropriation,
the ‘date on which the governmental “interference” has deprived the
owner of his rights or has made those rights practically useless’, will
often prove a daunting task for an international tribunal. Creeping expro-
priations, then, require in the first instance a meticulously fact-sensitive
inquiry in order to determine the moment at which liability for an expro-
priation attaches. But that moment need not—and in many cases, we sug-
gest below, should not—be equated with the moment at which the value
of expropriated property rights properly should be appraised for com-
pensation purposes. Consistent with customary international law and any
relevant bilateral or multilateral investment treaty provisions, which in
any event generally incorporate customary international law as a mini-
mum standard for the treatment of all investments, the latter moment
should be established in a manner that will enable a tribunal seized with a
claim based on a creeping expropriation to give full effect to the venerable
compensation principles articulated in Chorzów Factory.
C. C O N S E Q U E N T I A L E X P R O P R I AT I O N S
Other ‘measures tantamount to expropriation’ within the purview of a
BIT regime prove even more elusive than creeping expropriations
because they consist of the host state’s failures to create, maintain, and
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 Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB//, Award
of Feb. , , ()  ILM , ; accord Starrett Hous. Corp.,  ILM at  (‘[I]t is
recognized in international law that measures taken by a state can interfere with property rights to
such an extent that these rights are rendered so useless that they must be deemed to have been expro-
priated, even though the state does not purport to have expropriated them and the legal title to the
property formally remains with the original owner.’); see Weston, supra n. , at  (noting the ‘truism
that judgments of this kind [i.e. about when a series of events ripens into a creeping expropriation]
commonly depend on highly subjective responses to the fact patterns discerned’).
 E.g. U.S.-Russ. BIT, arts. II()(a), III().
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properly manage the legal, administrative, and regulatory normative
framework contemplated by the relevant BIT, an indispensable feature of
the ‘favourable conditions’ for investment. Again, this is not to say that
every governmental adjustment to the normative framework of the host
state that adversely affects foreign investment will constitute an expro-
priatory act. As the NAFTA tribunal in Feldman v Mexico said:
To paraphrase Azinian, not all government regulatory activity that makes it dif-
ficult or impossible for an investor to carry out a particular business, change in
the law or change in the application of existing laws that makes it uneconomical
to continue a particular business, is an expropriation under Article .
Governments, in their exercise of regulatory power, frequently change their laws
and regulations in response to changing economic circumstances or changing
political, economic or social considerations. Those changes may well make
certain activities less profitable or even uneconomic to continue.
Lawful regulation, that is, is not expropriation. Some self-described 
‘regulation’, however, can and should properly be deemed expropriatory.
In Feldman, the tribunal also aptly explained that
the ways in which governmental authorities may force a company out of busi-
ness, or significantly reduce the economic benefits of its business, are many. In
the past, confiscatory taxation, denial of access to infrastructure or necessary
raw materials, imposition of unreasonable regulatory regimes, among others,
have been considered to be expropriatory actions. At the same time, govern-
ments must be free to act in the broader public interest through protection of the
environment, new or modified tax regimes, the granting or withdrawal of gov-
ernment subsidies, reductions or increases in tariff levels, imposition of zoning
restrictions and the like. Reasonable governmental regulation of this type can-
not be achieved if any business that is adversely affected may seek compensa-
tion, and it is safe to say that customary international law recognizes this.
Thus, while a host state is not, of course, precluded from regulating
foreign investments, some regulations, and equally importantly, failures to
regulate, may rise to the level of expropriatory action. The ultimate
expropriatory effect of these failures will be painfully apparent, and at
least in retrospect, the causes can be identified: for example, feckless or
corrupt bureaucracies, lack of political will at the leadership level, negli-
gence or failure to make timely decisions incumbent on the state by virtue
of contracts or concession agreements, and so forth. But in consequential
expropriations, while there exists, to borrow terms from criminal law, an
actus reus and a corpus delicti, there may not exist a mens rea, an intent to
expropriate. The absence of this intent within at least some echelon of the
host state’s government distinguishes consequential expropriations from
garden-variety indirect expropriations and also from most, though not all,
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 Feldman v Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)//, Award of Dec. , , ()  ILM .
 Id., para. ,  ILM at  (paraphrasing Azinian v United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)//, Award of Nov. , , ()  ILM , , para. ).
 Id., para. ,  ILM at .
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creeping expropriations—for consequential expropriation can be accom-
plished in the same manner as creeping expropriations.
Consequential expropriations involve deprivations of the economic
value of a foreign investment, which, within the legal regime established
by a BIT, must be deemed expropriatory because of their causal links to
failures of the host state to fulfill its paramount obligations to establish
and maintain an appropriate legal, administrative, and regulatory norma-
tive framework for foreign investment. But because consequential expro-
priations result from misfeasances, malfeasances, and nonfeasances of the
host state, it often proves difficult to determine whether the acts and omis-
sions of the host state (i) were themselves the causa causans of the loss of
economic value or (ii) contributed to that loss; or by contrast, (iii)
whether the loss should rather be ascribed chiefly to the foreign investor’s 
misjudgments or (iv) to exogenous economic factors independent of the
actions (or inactions) of the host state. Where the losses that are the basis
of a claim should be ascribed chiefly to the latter two factors, as the
Permanent Court of Justice long ago established in the Oscar Chinn case,
the foreign investor enjoys no right to compensation. In some cases, of
course, the causes of the loss will fall clearly or predominantly in one of
these categories; in others, where they fall will be far less clear.
But even when it is clear that the host state’s acts and omissions caused,
or substantially caused, a legally significant depreciation in the economic
value of the investment, and would therefore qualify as expropriatory
within a BIT regime, determining the moment of expropriation for pur-
poses of valuation remains, as we noted earlier, an especially daunting
task. This intellectual operation, difficult in any indirect or creeping case,
becomes even more so in those cases of consequential expropriation
where some responsibility for the decline of the economic value of the
investment could be attributable to actions or judgements of the foreign
investor or to exogenous market factors. In these circumstances the
depreciation of the investment’s value may be caused by a complex series
of interactions between failures of the host state to fulfill its obligations
under the BIT, on the one hand, and misjudgements of the investor or
exogenous market factors, on the other.
The absence of an expropriatory decree, but the presence of an expro-
priatory consequence, defines a generic indirect expropriation. But also
common to most past indirect expropriations was an expropriatory intent
at some level of the governmental apparatus of the host state. In con-
sequential expropriations, states do not form an express intent to expro-
priate; indeed, they may not have such an intent at all. Even though a
state’s responsibility to pay compensation for expropriation does not, in
any event, ‘depend on proof that the expropriation was intentional’, the
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 The Oscar Chinn Case (Belgium v UK)  PCIJ Rep Series A/B No.  (Dec. ).
 Phillips Petroleum Co. v Iran ()  Iran-US CTR , ; see also Tippets v Tams-Affa
Consulting Eng’rs, ()  Iran-US CTR , –; Int’l Sys. & Control Operations v Indus. Dev.
and Renovation Org., ()  Iran-US CTR , para. ; Payne v Iran ()  Iran-US CTR ,
Crav1-CH03.qxd  15/11/04  9:00 PM  Page 130
manifestation of that intent at some level of the state’s government
generally furnishes a tribunal with a useful demarcation. It enables a
decision-maker not only to confirm that an expropriation has taken place,
but to set, based on relatively objective evidence, the moment of valua-
tion—typically, a point in time before the host state’s conduct occasioned
the depreciation in the value of the foreign investment.
Consequential expropriations lack such demarcations. Consider a few
hypothetical examples:
 the host state, privatizing a theretofore state-owned enterprise, promises
to establish a regulatory apparatus, but fails to;
 alternatively, the host state creates the appropriate regulatory appa-
ratus, but it proves to be grossly inefficient;
 alternatively, the host state creates the appropriate regulatory apparatus,
but in order to avoid layoffs in the public sector, staffs it with a bloated
and ineffective bureaucracy comprised principally of former employees
of the state-owned enterprise;
 a government agency of the host state delays beyond the statutory
deadline the grant to the foreign investor of a license required to engage
in certain investment activities, even though those same activities had
been authorized previously by a concession or build-operate-transfer
agreement with the government;
 local courts defer interminably decisions required by the BIT and crit-
ical to the profitability of the investment; or, because of the host state’s
failure to establish internal legal mechanisms to accommodate a BIT
regime, local courts enjoin, on the basis of that state’s internal laws,
investment activities previously authorized by the host state or one of
its political subdivisions;
 local government officials of one federated unit within the host state, in
order to curry favor with their political constituency, blame the foreign
investor in a theretofore publicly-owned but now privatized utility, for
economic difficulties caused principally by the inefficient bureaucracy
and infrastructure that the investor inherited, and indeed, which it was
the very intention of the host state to ameliorate by privatization and the
attraction and investment of foreign resources.
These types of actions (or, at times, delayed actions or failures to act)
would not have been cognizable as indirect expropriations under an
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para. ; Phelps Dodge Corp. v Iran, ()  US CTR , para. ; but see Sea-Land Service, Inc.
v Iran, ()  Iran-US CTR ,  (‘A finding of expropriation would require, at the very least,
that the Tribunal be satisfied that there was deliberate governmental interference with the conduct
of Sea-Land’s operation, the effect of which was to deprive Sea-Land of the use and benefit of its
investment. Nothing has been demonstrated here which might have amounted to an intentional
course of conduct directed against Sea-Land. A claim founded substantially on omissions and inac-
tion in a situation where the evidence suggests a widespread and indiscriminate deterioration in man-
agement, disrupting the functioning of the port of Bandar Abbas, can hardly justify a finding of
expropriation.’). Since Sea-Land, however, the principle that proof of intent is a necessary compo-
nent of an expropriation has ‘obtained no support in subsequent Tribunal awards, which generally
[have] quoted the relevant language from Tippetts’. Aldrich, supra n. , at .
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FCN regime, for in that regime the foreign investor took the host state’s
legal, administrative, and regulatory apparatus on an ‘as is’ basis.
Ineffective or inefficient government was often a manifest part of the ‘is’
and often the reason for, or a significant contributing factor to, the non-
development or impeded development in the host state. But in a BIT
regime, these delayed actions or inactions may represent violations of
legal obligations and therefore may, if the facts warrant it, be charac-
terized as ‘acts tantamount to expropriation’, for the BIT obliges
the host state to create normatively ‘favourable conditions’ for the
investment. This imports, as explained above, a variety of constitutive,
judicial, administrative, and regulatory actions to be undertaken by the
host state.
One of the reasons why failures to take internationally required admin-
istrative or judicial actions, characteristic of consequential expropria-
tions, present particularly knotty problems for tribunals engaged in
determining the moment of expropriation and moment of valuation is
that the foreign investor often will fail to perceive certain actions or 
non-feasances as expropriatory at the time they occur. The management
of a complex business in any environment is perforce a process of prob-
lem-solving. Managers may, at least initially, view these failures on the
part of the administrative or judicial apparatus of the host state as tran-
sient problems or early points on a learning curve for a new bureaucracy
or one relatively inexperienced in regulating foreign investment. Nor will
there exist evidence of an expropriatory intent on the part of the admin-
istrative or judicial actors concerned. In hindsight, managers (or their
critics) may come to believe that they should have seen the events in a
more ominous light, as the first in a series of actions that would culminate
in a consequential expropriation.
But hindsight, of course, is notoriously lucid. Only in retrospect does
it become evident that, regardless of the state’s intent, the cumulative
impact of its interferences with property rights would inevitably culmin-
ate in an aggregate effect tantamount to expropriation. And in any 
event, had the foreign investor or its manager immediately sought to
initiate arbitration under a BIT, a tribunal might well have thought it
unrealistic or premature, if not an abuse of process. Unlike direct expro-
priations, consequential expropriations need not, and seldom will, be
accomplished d’un coup, by a single act tantamount to expropriation; for
example, the decree of the Mossadegh Government of Iran expelling the
management of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company from the company’s
premises and installing new management, or the Indonesian military
police’s expulsion and replacement of the management of Amco Asia’s
hotel in Jakarta. Hence, as with creeping expropriations, no obvious
overt markers will exist to enable a tribunal to set the moment of valua-
tion at some point before the investor’s contemporaneous conclusion 
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 See generally A. Ford, The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute of – ().
 See Amco Asia Corp. v Indonesia, ICSID Award of Nov. , , ()  ILM .
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that it had been expropriated. Both creeping and consequential expro-
priations therefore make the tasks of discerning liability for expropria-
tion in the BIT generation—and, subsequently, assigning an economic
value to the enterprise so expropriated—far more difficult than the
corresponding tasks for direct expropriations (and, for that matter, many
garden-variety indirect expropriations).
III. MO M E N T O F EX P R O P R I AT I O N A N D VA LUAT I O N
Two widely accepted propositions of international law create a peculiar
problem for the arbitration tribunal seized of a consequential or creep-
ing expropriation claim cognizable under a governing BIT. The first is
that BITs, consistent with customary international law, require states
to pay compensation for expropriation, whether lawful or not, based on
a formula that calculates loss from the moment of expropriation. In the
words of one representative BIT: ‘Compensation shall be equivalent to
the fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately
before the expropriatory action was taken or became known, whichever
is earlier.’ The second is the venerable principle articulated more than
seventy years ago by the Permanent Court of International Justice in
Chorzów Factory: ‘that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all
the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which
would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been commit-
ted’. Because creeping and consequential expropriations, by their
nature, involve, respectively, either (i) an accretion of acts and omis-
sions over time, the propriety of which may be contemporaneously
unclear or evident only in retrospect; or (ii) acts or omissions the
illegality of which derives from the state’s failure or neglect to create
and maintain an appropriate normative environment, the moment of
expropriation seldom will be vividly demarcated and readily discern-
able by a tribunal seized with a claim for compensation based on such
state conduct. In the BIT generation, this epistemic difficulty raises
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 U.S.-Russ. BIT, art. III(); compare U.K.-Pan. BIT, art. () (‘[C]ompensation shall amount to
the fair value which the investment expropriated had immediately before the expropriation became
known.’); accord World Bank: Report to the Development Committee and Guidelines on the
Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, adopted Sept. , , ()  ILM ,  [here-
after World Bank Guidelines] (‘Compensation will be deemed “adequate” if it is based on the fair
market value of the taken asset as such value is determined immediately before the time at which the
taking occurred or the decision to take the asset became publicly known.’).
 Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland),  PCIJ Rep Series A No.  (Sept. ).
 Id. at .
 See Weston, supra n. , at – (noting that ‘it is very hard to get agreement on whether any
one or a combination of governmental acts, at once or over time, constitutes an “indirect,” “de
facto,” “disguised,” “constructive,” or “creeping expropriation” giving rise to State responsibility,’
partly because of ‘the extremely complex facts ordinarily involved and partly [because of] the prob-
lems of proof that attend them’); Koven, supra n. , at . (‘For “creeping” expropriation, where
a slow accretion of interferences with the investor’s management or control of the foreign enterprise
results in the inability of the project to continue, determining the date on which “an action” created
that result is an absurd exercise.’)
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certain practical problems with respect to, first, the determination of
liability; second, assuming the tribunal finds liability, the determina-
tion of what should constitute adequate reparation; and finally, how to
calculate that figure.
A. T H E C O N D I T I O N S F O R A L AW F U L E X P R O P R I AT I O N
Consistent with customary international law, BITs do not prohibit expro-
priation per se.82 In the exercise of their sovereignty over natural
resources or police powers, states remain entitled to expropriate foreign
property for a public purpose, provided it is done in a non-discriminatory
manner and accompanied by payment of ‘prompt, adequate, and effect-
ive’ compensation.83 ‘International law’, in the words of a recent ICSID
award, ‘permits [a state] to expropriate foreign-owned property within its
territory for a public purpose and against the payment of adequate and
effective compensation’.84 This so-called ‘compensation rule’, which
permits expropriation conditional on the payment of ‘prompt, adequate,
and effective’ compensation,85 has been widely, if not always unanimously,
embraced by jurists and scholars throughout the twentieth century.86
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 In certain cases it may also raise a jurisdictional issue, for the moment of expropriation
may determine whether a tribunal has jurisdiction under the applicable conventional regime. See,
e.g., Mondev Int’l Ltd. v United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)//, Award of Oct. , ,
()  ILM , –. At the same time, the moment that suffices to establish jurisdiction may
operate to impede the tribunal’s efforts to award compensation pursuant to the principles enunciated
in Chorzów Factory. The authors are grateful to Judge Charles N. Brower for pointing out this issue,
which, while not necessarily unique to the Algiers Accords and Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunals cases,
assumed a particular significance in that context.
 E.g., U.K.-Pan. BIT, art. () (‘Investments of nationals or companies of either Contracting
Party shall not be nationalised, expropriated or subjected to measures having effect equivalent to
nationalisation or expropriation (hereinafter referred to as “expropriation”) in the territory of the
other Contracting Party except for an internal public or social purpose against prompt, adequate and
effective compensation, and in conformity with the internal law.’); U.S. Arg-BIT, art. IV, section 
(‘Investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized either directly or indirectly through meas-
ures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization (“expropriation”) except for a public purpose;
in a non-discriminatory manner; upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation;
and in accordance with due process of law and the general principles of treatment provided for in
Article II () [which specifies the treatment that each state party must afford to investments of
nationals or companies of the other].’); compare, e.g., INA Corp. v Iran, ()  Iran-US CTR 
(‘It has long been acknowledged that expropriations for a public purpose and subject to conditions
provided for by law . . . are not per se unlawful.’).
 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law  (th ed. ); Dolzer & Stevens,
supra n. , at ; Christie, supra n. , at .
 Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB//, Award
of Feb. , , ()  ILM , ; accord Sedco, Inc. v Nat’l Ir. Oil Co., ()  Iran-
US CTR ,  ILM , – (Brower, J., concurring) (‘A taking is unlawful under customary
international law when it occurs in a discriminatory context, is not for a public purpose, or consti-
tutes a breach of a specific obligation undertaken by the nationalizing State in relation to the prop-
erty in question, e.g., violates the terms of an agreement between that State and an alien.’). The
legitimacy of the public purpose invoked to justify expropriation does not ‘alter the legal character
of the taking for which adequate compensation must be paid’. Santa Elena,  ILM at .
 E.g., Brownlie, supra n. , at – (explaining the compensation rule).
 Brice M. Clagett, Just Compensation in International Law: The Issues Before the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal, in IV The Valuation of Nationalized Property in International Law , 
(Richard B. Lillich ed., ); Christie, supra n. , at .
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Conventionally known as the ‘Hull formula’, the phrase ‘prompt,
adequate, and effective’ provides a facially clear standard. In practice,
however, ‘apart from the use of force, no question of international law
seems to have aroused as much debate—and often strong feelings—as the
question of the standard for payment of compensation when foreign
property is expropriated’. Particularly in the s and s, develop-
ing and communist states sought to establish an alternative rule author-
izing states to resort to their municipal laws to determine the appropriate
standard of compensation. With the demise of the Cold War and the
rise of the BIT generation, however, the Hull formula has firmly reestab-
lished itself as the preeminent standard. BITs generally incorporate its
traditional criteria in one form or another.
Merely restating the Hull formula, however, begs a number of questions,
foremost among them, the meaning of ‘prompt, adequate, and effective’
and comparable phrases. Because Chorzów Factory remains, notwith-
standing the passage of more than  years, the seminal international
decision about compensation under international law, it still provides the
fundamental normative framework within which to consider the propriety
of particular methods employed to determine ‘prompt, adequate, and
effective’ compensation for expropriation:
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act—a
principle which seems to be established by international practice and in particular
by the decisions of arbitral tribunals—is that reparation must, as far as possi-
ble, wipe out all the consequences of an illegal act and reestablish the situation
which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been commit-
ted. Restitution in kind, or if this is not possible, payment of a sum correspond-
ing to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be,
of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution in
kind or payment in place of it—such are the principles which should serve to
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 Dolzer & Stevens, supra n. , at  & note . The Hull formula originated in correspondence
from former U.S. Secretary of State Hull to the Mexican government in , in which he asserted
that ‘under every rule of law and equity, no government is entitled to expropriate private property,
for whatever purpose without provision for prompt, adequate and effective payment therefor.’ 
G. Hackworth, () Digest of International Law .
 Gudgeon, supra n. , at ; see also Oscar Schachter, Foreword, in IV The Valuation of
Nationalized Property in International Law vii (Richard B. Lillich ed., ).
 Clagett, supra n. , at –.
 See Brownlie, supra n. , at  (‘[A] considerable number of hosts to foreign capital are will-
ing to conclude treaties for the protection of investments which commonly contain a provision for
the payment of “prompt, adequate, and effective” compensation in case of expropriation. While
these are negotiated deals, the pattern of agreements surely constitutes evidence of an international
standard based upon the principle of compensation.’); see also Haliburton Fales, A Comparison for
Nationalization of Alien Property with Standards of Compensation Under United States Domestic
Law, in IV The Valuation of Nationalized Property in International Law , – (Richard B.
Lillich ed., ).  Dolzer & Stevens, supra n. , at , ; see also Brownlie, supra n. , at .
 The United States favors the Hull formula of ‘prompt, adequate, and effective’ compensation,
while other states use comparable or more general phrases ‘such as “just,” “full,” “reasonable” or
“fair and equitable” ’. Dolzer & Stevens, supra n. , at ; see also Gudgeon, supra n. , at –.
 See Higgins, supra n. , at .
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determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to inter-
national law.
Countless international tribunals have cited Chorzów Factory as the para-
mount compensation principle to guide determinations of the appropri-
ate measure of damages for expropriation. Notwithstanding some
suggestions to the contrary, it continues to represent the locus classicus
on compensation under international law.
B. P R I N C I P L E S O F VA LUAT I O N
To implement Chorzów Factory’s imperative in the context of an expro-
priation has traditionally required consideration of two issues: damnum
emergens, the value of the expropriated enterprise, including tangible
property, contract rights, and intangible valuables such as business good-
will; and lucrum cessans, lost profits. On the one hand, ‘the value of an
expropriated enterprise does not vary according to [its] lawfulness or . . .
unlawfulness’, because that value does not logically depend on the legal
‘characterization of a fact totally foreign to the economic constituents of
the undertaking, namely the conduct of the expropriating State’; on the
other, considerable, but hardly unanimous, authority supports the view
that international law requires states to pay a higher level of compensa-
tion for unlawful expropriations. The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has
emphasized that the ‘first principle established by the Court [in Chorzów
Factory] is that a clear distinction must be made between lawful and
unlawful expropriations, since the rules applicable to the compensation
to be paid by the expropriating State differ according to the legal char-
acterization of the taking’. The Tribunal continued: ‘The difference
is that if the taking is lawful the value of the undertaking at the time of the
dispossession is the measure and the limit of the compensation, while if
INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION AND
 Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland),  PCIJ Rep Series A No. , at  (Sept. ). The
Court confirmed the customary character of this obligation elsewhere in the judgment, remarking
that ‘[r]eparation therefore is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention and
there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself.’ Id. at . More recently, the
International Court of Justice held that the same principles applies to violations of customary inter-
national law. Corfu Channel (U.K. v Albania) (Merits), [] ICJ Rep ,  (Apr. ).
 E.g., Metalclad Corp. v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)//, Award of
Aug. , , ()  ILM , ; see also Amco Asia Corp. v Indonesia, Award of Nov. , ,
()  ILM ,  (collecting decisions and arbitral awards applying Chorzów Factory).
 Fales, supra n. , at . For an overview of the challenges to the traditional rule, which con-
cludes that its vitality nonetheless remains intact, see Clagett, supra n. , at –.
 See, e.g., Amoco Int’l Fin. Corp. v Iran, ()  Iran-US CTR , ()  ILM , .
 See id. at –; see also Clagett, supra n. , at –. (‘International decisions rendered both
before and after Chorzów Factory have declared as “universally accepted rules of law” that an
investor cannot be fully compensated for the going-concern value of his expropriated interests
unless he is awarded both the “damage that has been sustained” as a result of the taking and the reas-
onably ascertainable “profit that has been missed.” ’) (footnote and citations omitted).
 See Amoco Int’l Fin. Corp.,  ILM at  (collecting cases and arbitral awards).
 Id. at  (citing Chorzów Factory,  PCIJ Rep Series A No. , at – (Sept. )).
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it is unlawful, this value is, or may be, only part of the reparation to be
paid.’ Ian Brownlie’s treatise asserts to similar effect that
[t]he practical distinctions between expropriation unlawful sub modo, i.e., only if
no provision is made for compensation, and expropriation unlawful per se would
seem to be these: the former involves a duty to pay compensation only for direct
losses, i.e., the value of the property, the latter involves liability for consequen-
tial loss (lucrum cessans); . . .
One line of authority would therefore hold that for a lawful expropri-
ation, payment of damnum emergens suffices; for an unlawful expropriation,
the host state also owes compensation for reasonably ascertainable lost prof-
its.
The distinction between damnum emergens and lucrum cessans provides
a useful moral compass for distinguishing between lawful and unlawful
expropriations. But it is economically anachronistic when applied to
expropriations of foreign investments. In modern economic terms, the
value of an enterprise is not the enterprise itself; it is the stream of profits
it can be expected to produce over its lifetime. That forecast is what deter-
mines the price that the hypothetical willing buyer would pay the hypo-
thetical willing seller. To say that in an unlawful expropriation, the victim
must be awarded the value of the expropriated property and lost profits is
therefore to double-count. Yet the distinction between damnum emergens
and lucrum cessans, for all its anachronism, serves a useful policy purpose
insofar as it permits international tribunals to penalize egregious expro-
priations and, hopefully, to deter them in the future. For this reason, the
traditional distinction proves particularly significant in the context of
creeping expropriations. By definition, they seldom, if ever, will be law-
ful. Full compensation therefore should include lucrum cessans to fur-
ther the goal of deterrence. Otherwise, as Judge Brower suggested, ‘the
host state would pocket the difference between the lower value the under-
taking was shown by post-taking experience to have had and the higher
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 Id.  Brownlie, supra n. , at .
 See Amoco Int’l Fin. Corp.,  ILM at . (‘To this element of damnum emergens, a com-
plementary one is added where the expropriation is unlawful: the value of the revenues the owner
would have earned if the expropriation had not occurred, i.e., lucrum cessans.’)
 Sedco, Inc. v Nat’l Ir. Oil Co., ()  Iran-US CTR ,  ILM ,  (Brower, J., con-
curring). While a government conceivably might acknowledge the expropriatory effect of its regu-
latory acts and omissions at some point and pay an investor compensation as required by international
law, in practice, governments that expropriate an investment serially, by regulation or other cumu-
lative acts that depreciate its value, rarely, if ever, acknowledge that such acts comprise an expropri-
ation. Most frequently, they will claim that the acts represent a valid exercise of their police powers,
a response to a contractual breach by the investor or, perhaps, that the investor ‘assumed the risk’ of
the effect such acts would have on its investment and cannot now expect the government to pay
compensation for losses incurred in the ordinary course of business. Moreover, it is difficult to see
how an expropriation accomplished furtively, by a series of ostensibly valid measures that collectively
deprive an investor of its property rights, could be deemed to comport with the due process require-
ments for a lawful expropriation under most BITs. Hence, creeping expropriations, in practice if not
by definition, almost without exception prove to be unlawful.
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value it objectively enjoyed at the moment of taking . . . [N]o system of
law sensibly can be understood as intended to reward unlawful conduct’.
To digress briefly, it is important to recognize here that Judge Brower’s
approach is crafted for an indirect expropriation where no express decree
of expropriation exists, but credible evidence of an intent to expropriate
does. A further award of lucrum cessans serves to deny the expropriating
state any benefit from its delict. That the investor receives a reinforced
value of its expropriated investment is coincidental, for as Judge Brower
acknowledges, international law does not require an award of lucrum
cessans in cases of lawful expropriation. In cases of consequential expro-
priation, no expropriatory intent may be found, and the result of the
actions of the host state usually leave little in the way of the original
investment. The investment has not been seized and transferred to the
state or its designated beneficiary; it has been destroyed. Hence, an award
of lucrum cessans does not serve to deprive the host state of the profits of
the enterprise, for there are none. What is called, in this context, lucrum
cessans is essentially additive, a fine, the amount of which is supposedly
equivalent to the lucrum cessans of the failed enterprise. There may
well be sound reasons to sanction a state that fails to fulfill its BIT obliga-
tion to create or maintain a normative environment propitious to foreign
investment. But we find no basis for such a punitive award under custom-
ary international law at this time. We would therefore conclude that while
an award of what is called lucrum cessans may be warranted for some creep-
ing expropriations, it should not be for consequential expropriations.
BITs generally adopt the principles enunciated in Chorzów Factory in
substance if not form. A representative provision provides:
[‘[P]rompt, adequate, and effective’] [c]ompensation shall be equivalent to the
fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the expro-
priatory action was taken or became known, whichever is earlier; be paid with-
out delay; include interest at a commercially reasonable rate from the date of
expropriation; be fully realizable; and be freely transferable at the prevailing
market rate of exchange on the date of expropriation.
‘Fair market value’ is a term of art. It is generally taken to mean the price
that a willing buyer would pay a willing seller. The proper method
to calculate fair market value differs, however, depending on the nature
of the expropriated enterprise and the circumstances attending the
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 Amoco Int’l Fin. Corp.,  ILM at  note  (Brower, J., concurring); cf. Sedco, Inc. v Nat’l
Ir. Oil Co., ()  Iran-US CTR ,  ILM ,  note  (Brower, J., concurring) (sug-
gesting that punitive or exemplary damages might be sought for an unlawful expropriation because
otherwise ‘the injured party would receive nothing additional for the enhanced wrong done it and
the offending state would experience no disincentive to repetition of the unlawful conduct’).
 See Gudgeon, supra n. , at .
 U.S.-Arg. BIT, art. IV() (emphasis added); compare U.K.-Pan. BIT, art. () (‘Such com-
pensation shall amount to the fair value which the investment expropriated had immediately before
the expropriation became known, shall include interest until the date of payment, shall be made
without delay, be effectively realisable and be freely transferable.’).
 INA Corp. v Iran ()  Iran-US CTR , section III; see also Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law section  ().
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expropriation. Because the willing buyer is hypothetical, and because
the expropriated investor can hardly be characterized as a willing seller,
the willing-buyer-willing-seller formula, despite its redolence of econom-
ic precision, is actually quite speculative—far more of an art than a
science, as anyone who has reviewed expert opinions in these matters can
attest. Still, for going concerns (i.e. enterprises with a history of prof-
itability), fair market value generally includes, in addition to the net value
of the enterprise’s tangible assets on the date of the expropriation, ‘an
estimate of future profits subject to a discounted cash flow analysis’.
Economists employ the ‘going-concern’ method subject to a discounted
cash flow analysis in order to account for a potential decrease in the pro-
jected value of money over time and potential business risk.
The going-concern method has been adopted by many international
tribunals, for it seems to comport best with the principles established
by Chorzów Factory and its progeny. But it will not always be practica-
ble. In Metalclad, for example, the tribunal observed that ‘where the enter-
prise has not operated for a sufficiently long time to establish a
performance record or where it has failed to make a profit, future profits
cannot be used to determine going concern or fair market value’. In
these circumstances tribunals must resort to one of several common alter-
natives. These include (i) ‘book value’, the net value of an enterprise’s
assets; (ii) ‘replacement value’, an estimate of the amount ‘necessary to
create a similar undertaking’; (iii) ‘liquidation value’, the amount ‘at
which individual assets comprising the enterprise or the entire assets of the
enterprise could be sold under conditions of liquidation to a willing buyer
less any liabilities which the enterprise has to meet’; and (iv) ‘actual
investment’, the amount in fact invested prior to the expropriation.
Each method is appropriate in some circumstances but not others.
In , the World Bank, ‘[w]ithout implying the exclusive validity of
a single standard for the fairness by which compensation is determined’,
proposed guidelines to assist decision-makers in determining the most
suitable method in light of the nature of the expropriated enterprise:
(i) for a going concern with a proven record of profitability, on the basis of the
discounted cash flow value;
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 Dolzer & Stevens, supra n. , at ; see also Cornelius F. Murphy, Jr., Limitations Upon the
Power of a State to Determine the Amount of Compensation Payable to an Alien Upon Nationalization,
in III The Valuation of Nationalized Property in International Law ,  (Richard B. Lillich ed.,
) (‘The fairness of a compensation award depends upon a proper regard being paid to all rele-
vant considerations that, in varying degrees, touch upon the history of a given investment and its
future potential after acquisition by the nationalizing State.’).
 Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)//, Award of Aug. ,
, ()  ILM , . Future profits must be reasonably ascertainable, not speculative, for
‘[o]ne of the best settled rules of the law of international responsibility of States is that no repara-
tion for speculative or uncertain damage can be awarded’. Amoco Int’l Fin. Corp. v Iran () 
Iran-US CTR , ()  ILM , .  Clagett, supra n. , at .
 See id. at –.  Metalclad Corp.,  ILM at .
 Amoco Int’l Fin. Corp.,  ILM at .  World Bank Guidelines, supra n. , at .
 See Metalclad Corp.,  ILM at .
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(ii) for an enterprise which, not being a proven going concern, demonstrates
lack of profitability, on the basis of the liquidation value;
(iii) for other assets, on the basis of (a) the replacement value or (b) the book
value in case such value has been recently assessed or has been determined as of
the date of the taking . . .
Each of these methods perforce requires a tribunal to ascertain or 
stipulate the moment or date of expropriation. That date establishes the
reference point for calculating fair market value pursuant to any of these
methods. Decision-makers must therefore settle, by one mode of analysis
or another, upon a ‘moment of expropriation’ at which to appraise fair mar-
ket value. The often nebulous and convoluted factual circumstances that
comprise a creeping expropriation, and a fortiori a consequential expropri-
ation, tend to make the moment of expropriation elusive, assuming, that is,
that one can meaningfully be identified at all in such cases. At one
extreme, a tribunal could elect to set the moment of expropriation at the
date of the first governmental act or omission in the series of deleterious
measures that, in the aggregate, constitute the expropriation; at the other,
at the date of the last such measure. In the former case, adequate compen-
sation may not be provided because investors often continue—not neces-
sarily irrationally or irresponsibly, given the information available to them
contemporaneously—to invest after the initial act ‘tantamount to’ expro-
priation. In the latter, the ‘fair market value’ may well have depreciated
substantially, making compensation on that basis, too, inadequate insofar as
it evidently fails to respect Chorzów Factory’s imperative of restitutio in
integrum. The proper procedure in these circumstances is not obvious.
C. A LT E R N AT I V E S:  D E L I N K I N G E X P R O P R I AT I O N A N D
VA LUAT I O N
In a series of awards rendered in the s, the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal proposed that ‘where the alleged expropriation is car-
ried out by way of a series of interferences in the enjoyment of the prop-
erty, the breach forming the cause of action is deemed to take place on
the day when the interference has ripened into a more or less irreversible
deprivation of the property rather than on the beginning date of the
events’. That date, according to the Tribunal, must be ascertained by ref-
erence to the fact-specific ‘circumstances of each case’. The Tribunal
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 World Bank Guidelines, supra n. , at .
 Cf. Koven, supra n. , at  (expressing the view that ‘where a slow accretion of interferences
with the investor’s management or control of the foreign enterprise results in the inability of the pro-
ject to continue, determining the date on which “an action” created that result is an absurd exercise’).
 See infra text accompanying n. –.
 Malek v Iran, Award No. –– () Iran-US CTR, para.  (citing Int’l Technical
Prods. Corp. v Iran ()  Iran-US CTR , –, and Foremost Tehran Inc v Iran, () 
Iran-US CTR , ).
 Int’l Technical Prods. Corp. v Iran, ()  Iran-US CTR , ; see also Compañia del
Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB//, Award of Feb. , ,
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enunciated this proposition, however, in a series of decisions that, while
arising from diverse factual scenarios, nonetheless shared a common polit-
ical context, the  Islamic Revolution in Iran. That meant, in practice,
that in most cases involving indirect or creeping expropriations, the events
culminating in a compensable expropriation tended to be similar; for exam-
ple, the Iranian government’s gradual assumption of managerial control or
appointment of governmental ‘supervisors’ who tended over time to inter-
fere with foreign property rights in increasingly more intrusive ways.
Jurists and scholars generally cite Starrett Housing Corp. v Iran for
the proposition ‘that measures taken by a State can interfere with prop-
erty rights to such an extent that these rights are rendered so useless that
they must be deemed expropriated, even though the State does not pur-
port to have expropriated them and the legal title to the property for-
mally remains with the original owner’. That proposition remains
valid, and indeed, finds ample support in more recent arbitral awards.
But it is worth recalling that the majority award in Starrett adopted what
Judge Holtzmann, concurring, aptly described as a ‘sterile formalism’,
for it declined to appreciate the legal significance of the ‘steady and
inexorable’ progression of expropriatory events that preceded the
Iranian government’s formal appointment of a manager for the
claimant’s property. In consequence, the Tribunal effectively left it to
an expert to determine to what extent, if any, these events should be con-
sidered in assessing the fair market value of Starrett’s property rights as
of the moment of expropriation. While the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal added immeasurably to international jurisprudence on expro-
priation, including indirect expropriation, the question of the moment of
expropriation therefore rarely arose. As one judge of the Tribunal
acknowledged, ‘the often-difficult question of when allegedly temporary
interference with the rights of property owners should be considered to
have ripened into compensable taking or deprivation of those rights
rarely troubled the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal’.
The proliferation of bilateral and multilateral investment treaties
over the past decade, coupled with the tendency of governments now to
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()  ILM ,  (‘[E]xpropriated property is to be evaluated as of the date on which gov-
ernmental “interference” has deprived the owner of his rights or has made those rights practically
useless. This is a matter of fact for the Tribunal to assess in light of the circumstances of the case.’).
 ()  Iran-US CTR .  Id. section IV() ((Holtzmann, J., concurring).
 See, e.g., Metalclad Corp. v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)//, Award
of Aug. , , ()  ILM ,  (affirming that expropriation under the North American
Free Trade Agreement include not only formal expropriations, but also ‘covert or incidental inter-
ference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in signif-
icant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property’).
 Starrett Hous. Corp., ()  Iran-US CTR  section IV() (Holtzmann, J., concurring).
 Id. section IV() (noting that the majority award’s determination that the expropriation did
not occur until January , , ‘may, as a practical matter, have little effect on whatever damages
may be determined’ because, inter alia, ‘it is not yet known what method the expert will use to
determine the value of the expropriated property’, and ‘[u]nder some methods of valuation, the
later date of expropriation might have relatively little monetary significance’).
 Aldrich, supra n. , at .
Crav1-CH03.qxd  15/11/04  9:00 PM  Page 141
eschew formal expropriation, forces the phenomena of creeping and con-
sequential expropriations into sharper focus. More recent arbitrations,
principally conducted under the auspices of ICSID, indicate the extent
to which the relevant ‘moment of expropriation’ in cases of creeping
expropriations can prove slippery and elusive. But because ‘[v]irtually no
BITs make reference to [the] different valuation methods in their expro-
priation clause’, BITs deliberately invite or perhaps even require deci-
sion-makers to exercise discretion in determining the appropriate
method under the circumstances, including, where necessary, to ascertain
the appropriate ‘moment’ from which to calculate compensation pur-
suant to the method elected.
BITs establish the moment of expropriation by reference to ‘the fair
market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the
expropriatory action was taken or became known, whichever is earlier’.
The pertinent moments under the BIT therefore occur either on the
date of the expropriation or when the expropriation ‘bec[o]me[s]
known’. In the case of a direct, formal expropriation, both of these
moments will almost invariably be vivid and clearly demarcated, for
example, the date on which the government promulgates an executive or
legislative decree proclaiming its intent to expropriate. A creeping
expropriation, by contrast, involves an accretion of acts and omissions
of often nebulous legality that accrue over a longer time period, culmi-
nating in an aggregate effect tantamount to an outright expropriation.
A consequential expropriation involves a state’s interference with or
failure to create or maintain the normative legal, administrative, and
regulatory framework contemplated by a BIT, as a consequence of
which managerial control, profitability, and ultimately viability, erode.
Thus, the events comprising a creeping or consequential expropriation
far less frequently reveal a dramatic moment that demarcates the act of
expropriation.
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 See Francisco Orrego Vicuña, The International Regulation of Valuation Standards and
Processes: A Reexamination of Third World Perspectives, in III The Valuation of Nationalized
Property in International Law ,  (Richard B. Lillich ed., ) (‘In view of present inter-
national realities, it is neither possible nor desirable to try to establish a single standard or princi-
ple for the valuation of nationalized foreign property as a universal rule of international law. It is
more realistic to approach the problem through the development of a plurality of well-defined
standards.’); see also World Bank Guidelines, supra n. , at ; cf. Richard B. Lillich, The
Valuation of Nationalized Property by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, in I The
Valuation of Nationalized Property in International Law ,  (Richard B. Lillich ed., )
(noting, in the context of appraising the United States Foreign Settlement Claims Commission,
the desirability of submitting multiple methods of appraising the value of expropriated property
into evidence because it increases the ‘probability . . . that an adequate award will be made’) (cita-
tion and internal quotation marks omitted).
 E.g., U.S.-Arg. BIT, art. IV(); compare Model BIT of Austria, art. IV (‘[C]ompensation
shall amount to the value of the investment immediately preceding the time in which the actual
or impending [expropriatory] measure became public knowledge.’), with Model BIT of the
United Kingdom, art. () (‘[C]ompensation shall amount to the genuine value of the investment
expropriated immediately before the expropriation or before the impending expropriation became
public knowledge, whichever is earlier . . .’), in Dolzer & Stevens, supra n. , at , –; , .
 See Higgins, supra n. , at .
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In Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v Costa Rica, an
ICSID Tribunal echoed the standard enunciated by the Iran-U.S.
Claim’s Tribunal’s in Malek, remarking that ‘expropriated property is
to be evaluated as of the date on which governmental “interference” has
deprived the owner of his rights or has made those rights practically use-
less’. But in Santa Elena, Costa Rica had expropriated the claimant’s
property directly and lawfully: by formal decree, in a non-discriminato-
ry manner, and for a public purpose, viz., preservation of the environ-
ment. It did not contest the claimant’s right to compensation. In fact,
Costa Rica agreed that ‘the expropriating state [owes] a duty, in both
Costa Rican and international law, to pay compensation in respect of
even a lawful expropriation’, and ‘that the compensation to be paid
should be based upon the fair market value of the Property’.
The sole dispute in Santa Elena centered on determining the date
on which the claimant’s property had been expropriated for purposes
of assessing its fair market value. Costa Rica argued that the date of its
formal decree of expropriation also constituted the relevant moment of
expropriation for purposes of assessing fair market value. The Tribunal
agreed because ‘[a]s of that date, the practical and economic use of the
Property by the Claimant was irretrievably lost, notwithstanding that [the
Claimant] remained in possession of the Property.’ The Tribunal chose
this formal date of expropriation, not because it was the formal or legal date,
but because, as an economic fact, that was when the deprivation occurred.
Santa Elena therefore seems to instruct us that the moment of expropria-
tion for purposes of assessing the fair market value of the investment is the
moment when the practical and economic use of the investment is
irretrievably lost. In the circumstances of a creeping or consequential
expropriation, however, where the state takes property rights indirectly and
unlawfully, it becomes difficult if not impossible to discern when, precise-
ly, the foreign investor ‘irretrievably lost’ the value of its investment.
In the case of a direct expropriation accomplished by a formal decree,
such as Santa Elena, the expropriating state, by definition, determines
in the first instance the moment of expropriation. If the investor dis-
putes that determination, then, as in Santa Elena, it will be reviewed by
the jurisdiction to which the parties consented to submit their dispute.
Conversely, it is the foreign investor, by its allegation, that ‘determines’
in the first instance the moment of expropriation where, as in the case
of a creeping or consequential expropriation, the state has allegedly
ITS VALUATION IN THE BIT GENERATION 
 ICSID Case No. ARB//, Award of Feb. , , ()  ILM .
 See supra n. – and accompanying text.  Id. at , para.  (emphasis added).
 Id. at –.  See id. at .  Id. at .
 The Santa Elena tribunal implicitly recognized that creeping expropriations may present a dis-
tinct inquiry vis-à-vis valuation. The tribunal observed, for example, that ‘[a] decree which heralds
a process of administrative and judicial consideration of the issue [i.e. control over an investment or
property rights] in a manner that effectively freezes or blights the possibility for the owner reason-
ably to exploit the economic potential of the property, can, if the process thus triggered is not carried
out within a reasonable period of time, properly be identified as the actual act of taking.’ Id. at .
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expropriated an investment through a gradual accretion of acts of
malfeasance and nonfeasance or, even more elusively, by failing to estab-
lish or undermining the normative framework on which the foreign
investor relied. Needless to say, that allegation, if disputed, remains
subject to review by the jurisdiction to which the parties consented to
submit their dispute. The point is not to enable foreign investors to
obtain a windfall by identifying an unreasonably early stage as the rele-
vant date of expropriation; it is to enable the tribunal to appreciate the
effect of the investor’s perception of expropriation in determining the
fair market value of the expropriated investment in circumstances where
the state concerned has less to contribute to the clarification of this
issue. Because of the nature of creeping and consequential expropria-
tions, that is, it will be the foreign investor’s initial allegation of when
the expropriation ‘became known’ that frames the dispute.
The paramount policy objectives of BITs support this conclusion.
States conclude BITs principally to encourage reciprocal foreign invest-
ment, and, as a means to that end, to provide a stable and predictable
framework for investment by each party’s nationals in the territory of the
other. That goal obviously would be ill-served by any policy that rewards
creeping or consequential expropriations. Yet investors will often be
either unaware or inclined to resist the conclusion that a host state has, by
an act or acts of nebulous legality (the economic effects of which remain
unknown at the time), initiated what will ultimately constitute an expro-
priation. Often, foreign investors will be anxious to rescue or fortify their
investments in the face of discrete harmful acts or regulatory omissions.
Government officials may also assure them that a single ‘measure tanta-
mount to expropriation’ represents an anomaly; it will be swiftly repaired
or compensated, whether directly or by some other indulgence or offset.
In these circumstances investors anxious to save their investments may
well be inclined to sink further capital into them in an effort to compen-
sate for the harmful governmental interferences or other measures tanta-
mount to expropriation. This is particularly so where an investor
reasonably believes, based on knowledge of the prevailing political and
economic conditions, that the host state will not provide ‘prompt, ade-
quate, and effective’ compensation. Investment of further capital in such
cases reflects a desperate attempt to save the investment, and under the
circumstances, may be the only rational and responsible course of action.
To penalize the investor for such efforts may well be, to use an American
expression, ‘Monday-morning-quarter-backing’, unreasonably requiring
clairvoyance on the part of the investor.
While the decision to invest further capital, to hang on ‘stoically . . .
in the face of host government interference’, may at times be 
ascribed in part to the vicissitudes of business risk (and, as such, should
INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION AND
 Koven, supra note , at .
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not be compensable), at other times it reflects a natural reaction to prior
measures tantamount to expropriation. The decision of the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in Foremost Tehran, Inc. v Iran,
for example, indicates ‘that continued efforts within a company by
shareholders to protect their interests [in the face of escalating govern-
mental acts that serially diminish the value of their property rights]
could endanger [the shareholders’] ultimate prospects of success [on a
claim for expropriation]’. Victims of creeping or consequential
expropriations therefore may recognize expropriatory conduct at a rel-
atively early stage, but resist yielding to it for as long as possible, hop-
ing to reverse it.
Alternatively, foreign investors may realize only in retrospect that the
ineluctable consequence of various acts of governmental interference or
measures already taken, being taken or—in the case of nonfeasance—not
being taken, has been to effect an expropriation. Many of the constituent
pieces of a creeping expropriation may be disguised as legitimate, or
arguably legitimate, regulatory acts, responses to alleged contract breaches
or temporary exercises of a state’s police power. In Liberian Eastern
Timber Corp. (LETCO) v Liberia, it will be recalled, the Liberian gov-
ernment withdrew portions of LETCO’s initial concession first in ,
then in , and again in . It demanded renegotiation of LETCO’s
concession agreement in . It then accused LETCO of breaching that
agreement, and on that basis, withdrew still greater portions of the con-
cession. The government ultimately claimed that LETCO could not
exploit the remaining concession areas and thereby justified its decision
to reassume control of them. But only in November , more than
one year after LETCO finally elected to institute arbitration, did the
government formally acknowledge its decision to nullify the concession
agreement based on alleged breaches by LETCO. While LETCO
undoubtedly understood that the government’s actions threatened its
investment and had already depreciated that investment’s value substan-
tially, it chose not to institute arbitral proceedings until March .
This suggests that LETCO’s management either failed fully to appreci-
ate the aggregate expropriatory effect of the Liberian government’s
actions until that time or that it sought desperately to rescue its invest-
ment by all means before resorting to compulsory dispute resolution, for,
in the interim, ‘LETCO continued to petition the highest governmental
bodies of the Republic of Liberia so that they might intervene on its
behalf to correct the situation’.
ITS VALUATION IN THE BIT GENERATION 
 ()  Iran-US CTR .
 Adrich, supra n. , at ; see also id. at  (observing that ‘in several cases property owners
found that their claims before the Tribunal had been prejudiced by their prior efforts to retain or
exercise their rights in the property after they had been substantially deprived of those rights by
actions attributable to Iran’).
 Award of Mar. ,  (rectified May , ), ()  ILM .
 LETCO,  ILM at .  Id.  Id. at .
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All this is not to suggest, however, that investors should, or should be
entitled to, cry ‘expropriation’ at the first sight of adverse governmental
conduct. That, too, would be contrary to the objective of BITs to estab-
lish a stable, hospitable, normative framework for reciprocal foreign
investment. It would be destructive of the normative goals of BITs for
the law to encourage foreign investors prematurely to claim that their
investments have been expropriated and to resort to compulsory dispute
resolution under the relevant BIT provision. General international law
has long discouraged and reprehended premature invocation of third-
party dispute resolution. At the same time, for the foregoing reasons, the
general rule proposed by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal may not always
be well-tooled for determining the moment of expropriation for purpos-
es of assessing the fair market value of an investment subjected to a creep-
ing or consequential expropriation. Were the critical moment of
expropriation for purposes of valuation set at the date of the last of the
series of deleterious governmental acts of malfeasance or nonfeasance that
‘ripened into a more or less irreversible deprivation of the [investment]’,
then the fair market value of that investment may well be determined to
be substantially less than were the critical moment set at the date of one of
the earlier acts. The ironic, indeed perverse, result of that theory would be
to reward states for accomplishing expropriation tranche par tranche rather
than d’un coup and to encourage states to accomplish expropriation
furtively, either by a creeping or disguised series of regulatory acts and
omissions of nebulous legality (creeping expropriation) or by evasion or
abdication of the often politically difficult task of establishing an appro-
priate normative environment for investment (consequential expropria-
tion). Conversely, it would penalize foreign investors for attempting to
avoid expropriation and sustain their investments by, inter alia, fortifying
them with additional capital in the face of measures of nebulous legality.
These results would be calamitous. In the first place, they contravene
the venerable and general legal principle, common to municipal and
international law, that a delictor may not benefit from its own delict.
Second, contrary to the objectives of BITs, they would encourage for-
eign investors promptly to resort to compulsory dispute-resolution at an
early stage rather than seek to resolve matters amicably through negotia-
tion with the host state—lest the investor risk losing potential compensa-
tion as the fair market value of its investment progressively depreciates
with each subsequent measure ‘tantamount to expropriation’. It would
be implausible to ascribe an intention to produce such results to the
drafters of BITs. It would also be wholly inconsistent with the general
principles of international law on compensation explained in the preceding
section and for which Chorzów Factory remains the lodestar. Hence, the
INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION AND
 See Koven, supra n. , at  (noting one example of this phenomena arising out of the
Iranian revolution, whereby ‘every month allowed to lapse between the closing of the [investor’s]
plant and the [formal] date of expropriation reduced the value of the net investment’).
 Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland),  PCIJ Rep Series A No. , at  (Sept. ).
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Iran-U.S. Claim’s Tribunal’s proposition—that ‘where the alleged
expropriation is carried out by way of a series of interferences in the
enjoyment of the property’, the moment of expropriation is ‘the day
when the interference has ripened into a more or less irreversible depri-
vation of the property rather than on the beginning date of the
events’—may threaten to work a manifest injustice in circumstances of
creeping or consequential expropriations: It conflates the ‘moment of
expropriation’ with what might be denominated the ‘moment of valua-
tion’, the date on which the fair market value of an investment so expro-
priated should be assessed for purposes of determining the ‘prompt,
adequate, and effective’ compensation required by customary interna-
tional law and codified in BITs. There is no reason why the results of
these two analyses should be temporally congruent.
Some methods of calculating fair market value may mitigate or even
obviate the problem. If, for example, the host state accomplishes a
creeping expropriation before a foreign enterprise begins operating or
even before the entire investment has been made, then it may be legally
sufficient to award the foreign investor the sum total of its actual
investment. The ICSID tribunal in Metalclad Corp. v United Mexican
States reached that conclusion, for example, and cited precedents
reaching the same result under comparable circumstances. But to
calculate fair market value on the date of the last ‘measure tantamount
to expropriation’ that ‘ripened’ into a manifest expropriation would be,
according to most other methods of valuation (e.g., book value, liqui-
dation value, and replacement value), to assess an investment’s value at
the very ‘moment’ when the accretion of unlawful acts of the host
state has so dramatically devalued the investment as to render it de facto
expropriated—its ‘practical and economic use’ having been, by that
time, ‘irretrievably lost’. That theory of valuation could encourage
states to accomplish expropriations furtively and indirectly, by regula-
tory malfeasance, misfeasance, or non-feasance, or by a ‘creeping’ pro-
gression of deleterious actions or inactions, no one of which, however,
may be readily identified by an objective decision-maker as the critical
‘moment’.
ITS VALUATION IN THE BIT GENERATION 
 Malek v Iran, Award ––, para.  () (citing Int’l Technical Prods. Corp. v Iran,
()  Iran-US CTR , –).
 Cf. Starrett Hous. Corp. v Iran, ()  Iran-US CTR ,  ILM ,  (Holtzmann J.,
concurring) (observing in analogous circumstances that ‘under some methods of valuation, [a] later
date of expropriation might have relatively little monetary significance as compared to an earlier date’).
 Metalclad Corp. v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB//, Award of Aug. ,
, ()  ILM , .
 Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB//, Award
of Feb. , , ()  ILM , ; cf. Borg v Int’l Silver Co.,  F.d ,  (d Cir. )
(Hand, J.):
The suggestion that the book value of the shares is any measure of their actual value is clearly fal-
lacious. It presupposes, first, that book values can be realized on liquidation, which is practically
never the case; and, second, that liquidation values are a measure of present values. Every one
knows that the value of shares in a commercial or manufacturing company depends chiefly on
what they will earn, on which balance sheets throw little light.
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That said, the crucial point is not that the proposition enunciated by the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal is necessarily ‘wrong’. It may well provide the
appropriate standard for discerning the proper moment of expropriation
in many cases of indirect expropriations, where it makes sense to identify
the act of expropriation more closely with one or two discrete events,
e.g., the fixing of a price or the appointment of a governmental ‘supervisor’.
It should, however, be applied with caution when invoked to assess the fair
market value of an investment expropriated consequentially or by a creep-
ing accretion of measures. BITs and comparable multilateral invest-
ment treaties should, as a matter of both the intent of their drafters and
the policies that animate them, be construed to deter, not reward, unlaw-
ful expropriations of all kinds. If application of the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal’s standard in practice reduces the amount of compensation due
to victims of creeping or consequential expropriations, then, we suggest,
the ‘moment of expropriation’ should be distinguished from the ‘moment
of valuation’ for these purposes. And again, it is in this regard that the
determination in the first instance of the investor is perforce the starting
point for analysis. In any event, and whatever the method adopted by a
tribunal to determine the proper ‘moment of expropriation’ in
circumstances of creeping and consequential expropriations, that deter-
mination must enable the tribunal to give full effect to Chorzów Factory’s
imperative ‘that reparation must, so far as possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would,
in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed’.
While the approach we suggest has yet to be adopted expressly, several
prior awards implicitly recognize the need to distinguish between the
moment of expropriation, where that phrase denotes the completion
of certain formalities, and the moment of valuation, the date on which
the fair market value of the claimant’s property should be assessed for
purposes of providing ‘prompt, adequate, and effective’ compensation. In
Amoco International Finance Corp. v Iran, the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal found the expropriation of Amoco’s contract rights to be ‘com-
plete’ on December , , when the Iranian Minister of Petroleum
formally notified Amoco’s management that it viewed a  joint ven-
ture between Amoco and the Iranian National Petrochemical Company
as null and void. But the Tribunal nonetheless awarded Amoco compen-
sation based on the value of its interest as of July , , the date on
which the Tribunal determined the de facto taking to have occurred.
INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION AND
 This is particularly true because, as the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has observed, market value
‘is an ambiguous concept, to say the least . . . when an open market does not exist for the expropriated
asset or for goods identical or comparable to it’. Amoco Int’l Fin. Corp. v Iran, ()  Iran-US CTR
,  ILM , .  (Germany v Poland)  PCIJ Rep Series A No. , at  (Sept. ).
 ()  Iran-US CTR , ()  ILM .
 Id. at ; see also Aldrich, supra n. , at  (‘[B]y making the valuation date July , ,
the Tribunal implicitly accepted that as the effective date of the taking, rather than the date of the
subsequent completion of the formalities.’).
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Moreover, as a general matter, the approach we suggest comports with
customary international law, which dictates that valuation of expropriated
property must exclude ‘any diminution in value attributable to wrongful
acts’ of the expropriating government. The depressing effect on values
of threats or acts of nationalization must be ignored in ascertaining the
market value of subsequently nationalized enterprises. Valuation in such
cases is ‘calculated as if the expropriation or other governmental act had
not occurred and was not threatened’.
IV. CO N C LU S I O N
As early as , Martin Domke wrote that ‘[a]n outright transfer of title
may no longer constitute the foremost type of “taking” property in the
technique of modern nationalization. There are various other means of
“creeping” or “disguised” nationalization through regulations of foreign
governments.’ The past four decades have validated that observation.
With the demise of major socialist economies and the increasing accept-
ance of free-market economics by even those that nominally remain—
of which the People’s Republic of China provides perhaps the major
example—states today rarely expropriate foreign investments by formal
decree. But the failure of political and economic administrations in many
states continues to contribute to the relatively frequent phenomenon of
indirect expropriations, particularly those that, we suggest, should more
precisely be denominated ‘creeping’ or ‘consequential’ expropriations.
BITs and comparable multilateral investment treaties, which have
become the preeminent mechanisms for preventing expropriations,
compensating its victims, and thereby preserving the ‘favourable
ITS VALUATION IN THE BIT GENERATION 
 Starrett Hous. Corp., ()  Iran-US CTR ,  ILM ,  (Howard M. Holtzmann,
concurring); see also id. at  (expressing the view that the majority award should not have sug-
gested a mode of valuation, but should rather have ‘included an express instruction to the expert to
exclude any diminution in value attributable to wrongful acts of Iran before the date of taking.’).
 Lillich, supra n. , at  note  (quoting  M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law 
()); see, e.g., Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v Costa Rica, ICSID Case No.
ARB//, Award of Feb. , , ()  ILM ,  (observing, in the course of assessing
the value of the claimant’s property as of the moment of expropriation, the absence of ‘evidence that
its value at that date was adversely affected by any prior belief or knowledge that it was about to be
expropriated’). Nevertheless, in cases of ‘creeping’ expropriations, this rule cannot, by itself, repair the
damages to the investor per Chorzów Factory, for a creeping expropriation may be accomplished by a
series of acts that, by themselves, appear innocuous or of ambiguous legality, but together plainly
deprive the foreign investor of its property rights. For instance, in the ICSID arbitration of Benvenuti
et Bonfant v People’s Republic of the Congo, Award of Aug. , , ()  ILM , the claimant
cited, among other events cumulatively comprising the expropriation, the failure of the Congolese
government to ‘convene the Board of Directors as often as would have been desirable for solving the
difficulties of the Company.’ Id. at . While that dereliction, by itself, may have depreciated the
value of the company jointly owned by the claimant and the government, it would be implausible to
contend that this act alone constituted an expropriation. Only in the context of the entire series of
events comprising the creeping expropriation could its contribution to the creeping expropriation ulti-
mately accomplished by the Congolese government be properly appreciated. The legality of certain
expropriatory events, in short, may be less than clear where it is their cumulative effect that constitutes
the expropriation.  Domke, supra n. , at –.
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conditions’ for mutually beneficial reciprocal foreign investment, must
respond to these changes in a manner consistent with the longstanding
principles of customary international law.
To calculate compensation for consequential and creeping expropria-
tions carried out within the legal universe of a BIT, tribunals can no
longer be content to evaluate the fair market value of an expropriated
investment as of the date when an accretion of governmental acts and
omissions has so dramatically devalued that investment as to render it
‘practically useless’ or its value ‘irretrievably lost’. Because these princi-
ples may, in practice, threaten the stable and mutually beneficial norma-
tive framework for reciprocal foreign investment that states design BITs
to create and maintain, international tribunals seeking to award compen-
sation for investments expropriated consequentially or by a creeping
series of measures ‘tantamount to’ expropriation may benefit from an
alternative principle. Above all, any standard adopted to determine the
appropriate date from which to calculate compensation should effectively
deter, not reward, consequential and creeping expropriations.
In this regard tribunals seized with cases raising these issues may find
it both useful and appropriate to disaggregate the moment of expropria-
tion and the moment of valuation—to distinguish the ‘moment of
expropriation’, which goes to the question of liability (i.e. whether an
accretion of measures has ripened into a compensable expropriation),
from the ‘moment of valuation’, which goes to the question of damages.
Because creeping and consequential expropriations frequently demand
highly fact-sensitive inquiries, it is neither possible nor prudent to sug-
gest a monolithic or bright-line rule for calculating compensation in
these circumstances. But as a general principle, the moment of valuation
should be the date on which assessing the fair market value of a foreign
investment for purposes of calculating compensation will enable a tri-
bunal to give full effect to Chorzów Factory’s imperative. Adoption of
this principle, in our view, would contribute in the long term to fortify-
ing the stable and predictable legal regime for reciprocal foreign invest-
ment upon which both foreign investors and developing states depend in
the BIT generation.
INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION AND
 Whether and to what extent BITs codify customary international law remains an open ques-
tion. The nearly , BITs in existence today, see supra n. , and the increasing citation and appli-
cation of general principles enunciated in arbitral awards rendered on the basis of their standards,
suggests that the broader conception of expropriation embodied by BITs to some extent has
become—and to some extent remains in the process of becoming—customary international law,
insofar as states begin to acknowledge these standards as legally binding in contexts not governed
by BITs. In S.D. Myers Inc. v Canada, Award of Nov. , , ()  ILM , a NAFTA
tribunal affirmed that the minimum standards of treatment for investments prescribed by NAFTA,
which include the requirements for a lawful expropriation, and which mirror those contained in
most BITs, conform generally to customary international law. See id. at , paras , .; see
also CME Czech Republic B.V. v The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Final Award of Mar. , ,
para.  (observing that the some , BITs and similar multilateral investment treaties have
become ‘truly universal in their reach and essential provisions’ and suggesting that their ‘concor-
dant provisions are variations on an agreed, essential theme’).
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